TW said ...
This (was) a ridiculous post. The ratio of Ramirez to Pierre to that of Hudson to Castillo is astronomically different. hudson hasn't played a full season in two years and his wrist is still in question. Castillo has looked good in st and can play comparable defense to Hudson. If the power numbers are what is bothering you, you're crazy.
Ramirez is going to hit over .310-.325. with 40+ homers and 130 RBIs Pierre will hit .260 with 3 HRs and 40 rbis. Point is you can compare a healthy Castillo to Hudson. You can't say the same in regards Ramirez.
Met fans are insane. Simply put, the reason the mets didn't make the playoffs last year is because the bullpen could not hold a lead. Forget every other factor. If the bullpen saved half of the games they blew last season they would have had 15 more wins. Hudson, castillo--joe Morgan wouldn't have changed that. Cased closed.
You're wrong and I'll tell you why.
First, it's not about a direct comparison of the four players (Manny to Pierre and Hudson to Castillo). It's a comparsion of the philosophies. Both teams had two positions on the diamond at which to consider upgrades - left field and second base. Both teams had an under-performing veteran at one position (Castillo in NY and Pierre in LA), and a platoon featuring a promising young player and a veteran at the other position (Murphy/Tatis in NY, Dewitt/Loretta in LA).
The Dodgers upgraded at both positions and strengthened their bench in the process. They may have the best everyday lineup in the National League right now. The Mets did nothing and congratulated themselves all winter for adding two relievers. They will simply have to hope for the best at the plate, leaving themselves with a series of question marks and easily exploitable holes in their lineup.
Personally, I like general managers who never stop trying to improve their teams, not general managers who hitch their fortunes to a series of "what-if" scenarios.
Second, it is an incredible over-simplification of the problem to say that the only thing this team needed to fix was the bullpen after last season. The notion that a team can make up 15 games in the standings on the strength of 130 innings pitched by two relievers defies all forms of logic. JJ Putz was injured and ineffective throughout 2008 - is he suddenly going to become a dominant set-up man because Omar Minaya told us he will be? K-Rod's strikeout rate has declined annually for the last five seasons and his 2008 WHIP was the highest of his career. Does your "additional 15 wins" scenario include seven more blown saves from K-Rod - the number he blew in 2008?
Every team in baseball blows saves - even the Phillies blew 15 of them last year. (You thought that because Brad Lidge was 41-for-41 it meant that Philadelphia's entire bullpen didn't blow their share of leads as well?) Met fans who actually think the only thing they needed to fix is the bullpen are deluding themselves - and will actually be shocked when this team limps home with 84 wins.
One last thought: JJ Putz and Francisco Rodriguez combined for 15 blown saves in 114.7 innings in 2008. The two men they are replacing - Billy Wagner and Aaron Heilman - had 12 blown saves in 113 innings. Good luck finding those 15 wins.
Showing posts with label The Readers Strike Back. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Readers Strike Back. Show all posts
Monday, March 9, 2009
Sunday, December 21, 2008
How Does Speed Affect the Batter?
Reader LCee asked earlier this week: "Jack, several years ago, Joe Sheehan made the comment to the effect of: a fast runner on the bases might distract the pitcher and certain infield position players, but that pales in comparison to the impact on the hitter, as he must protect the runner with lame swings when the runner attempts a steal. What is your take?"
It's an interesting question and one that deserves some consideration. I believe that the article LCee is quoting from is this Baseball Prospectus piece from 2004, which includes this passage: The vaunted secondary effects of stealing bases--distracting the pitcher, putting pressure on the defense--do not appear to exist. In fact, most secondary effects argue in favor of keeping the runner on first base. A runner on first is more disruptive to a defense, with the first baseman holding and the second baseman cheating towards second for a double play, than a runner on second. Additionally, studies show that stolen-base attempts negatively impact the performance of the batter at the plate, presumably due to hitters getting themselves into negative counts by taking pitches or swinging at bad balls to protect the runner.
The article doesn't include links to any studies that show negligible secondary effects of base-stealing or the supposed negative impact that a runner attempting a steal has on the batter. Sheehan has numbers on his side, so if I see the studies he's referencing it will surely be harder to support my perspective. From a common-sense standpoint, however, it's difficult to believe that an altered pitching motion and a limited pitch selection does not favor the batter.
A pitcher generally changes his pitching motion when holding a runner on base, by throwing from the stretch to decrease the amount of time it takes to deliver the ball to the catcher. Pitch selection changes as well; a pitcher simply cannot throw as many breaking balls to a batter with Jose Reyes on first base, because if Reyes tries to steal on a breaking pitch he's going to be standing safely on second.
The arguments about defensive positioning make sense, and I agree that the batter - especially if he's left-handed - benefits more from a big hole between first and second base then from simply having the runner on second. Still, any run expectancy matrix shows that a team is more likely to score with a runner on second than with a runner on first, given the same amount of outs. Given that, I simply cannot agree with Sheehan's first contention.
One other point: no study can possibly measure the psychological effects that a fast runner on first has on the pitcher, and I have to believe that most hurlers are simply less comfortable with a runner on base then pitching with the bases empty. I know I'm veering dangerously close to "intangibles" territory here by trying to predict psychological influences, but I do think the logic behind my thinking is strong. Again, if I saw some of the studies that Sheehan referenced, I may think differently.
However, I do not need to see any studies to be convinced of Sheehan's second contention. All the advantages that I believe the batter has with a fast runner on first are immediately given away the second that the runner actually takes off. The best possible scenario is that the pitcher throws a ball that is clearly out of the strike zone and the batter recognizes this and checks his swing, allowing the baserunner to steal safely. Otherwise, the batter finds himself taking a strike in an attempt to let the runner steal, or takes a defensive hack to protect the runner and to avoid the double play.
Forget about the hole that appears when the shortstop or the second baseman goes to cover on the steal attempt; a hitter trying to hit the ball through that hole is indeed taking a compromised swing and therefore less likely to hit safely. In my opinion, the best thing the batter can do is simply step back and let the runner earn his base, without trying to help out.
It's an interesting question and one that deserves some consideration. I believe that the article LCee is quoting from is this Baseball Prospectus piece from 2004, which includes this passage: The vaunted secondary effects of stealing bases--distracting the pitcher, putting pressure on the defense--do not appear to exist. In fact, most secondary effects argue in favor of keeping the runner on first base. A runner on first is more disruptive to a defense, with the first baseman holding and the second baseman cheating towards second for a double play, than a runner on second. Additionally, studies show that stolen-base attempts negatively impact the performance of the batter at the plate, presumably due to hitters getting themselves into negative counts by taking pitches or swinging at bad balls to protect the runner.
The article doesn't include links to any studies that show negligible secondary effects of base-stealing or the supposed negative impact that a runner attempting a steal has on the batter. Sheehan has numbers on his side, so if I see the studies he's referencing it will surely be harder to support my perspective. From a common-sense standpoint, however, it's difficult to believe that an altered pitching motion and a limited pitch selection does not favor the batter.
A pitcher generally changes his pitching motion when holding a runner on base, by throwing from the stretch to decrease the amount of time it takes to deliver the ball to the catcher. Pitch selection changes as well; a pitcher simply cannot throw as many breaking balls to a batter with Jose Reyes on first base, because if Reyes tries to steal on a breaking pitch he's going to be standing safely on second.
The arguments about defensive positioning make sense, and I agree that the batter - especially if he's left-handed - benefits more from a big hole between first and second base then from simply having the runner on second. Still, any run expectancy matrix shows that a team is more likely to score with a runner on second than with a runner on first, given the same amount of outs. Given that, I simply cannot agree with Sheehan's first contention.
One other point: no study can possibly measure the psychological effects that a fast runner on first has on the pitcher, and I have to believe that most hurlers are simply less comfortable with a runner on base then pitching with the bases empty. I know I'm veering dangerously close to "intangibles" territory here by trying to predict psychological influences, but I do think the logic behind my thinking is strong. Again, if I saw some of the studies that Sheehan referenced, I may think differently.
However, I do not need to see any studies to be convinced of Sheehan's second contention. All the advantages that I believe the batter has with a fast runner on first are immediately given away the second that the runner actually takes off. The best possible scenario is that the pitcher throws a ball that is clearly out of the strike zone and the batter recognizes this and checks his swing, allowing the baserunner to steal safely. Otherwise, the batter finds himself taking a strike in an attempt to let the runner steal, or takes a defensive hack to protect the runner and to avoid the double play.
Forget about the hole that appears when the shortstop or the second baseman goes to cover on the steal attempt; a hitter trying to hit the ball through that hole is indeed taking a compromised swing and therefore less likely to hit safely. In my opinion, the best thing the batter can do is simply step back and let the runner earn his base, without trying to help out.
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
More on Piazza
The Piazza column at Flushing University today generated some conversation, mainly because not everyone believes he deserves to have his number retired. I think I'm generally pretty picky when it comes to retiring numbers. It's not something that I would suggest lightly, but I truly believe that Piazza stands out in a way no Met position player has ever done and deserves special recognition for it. Even though she disagreed with my column, I thought one poster put it very well when she listed her criteria for a retired number:
* IF Piazza had been a longer-term Met;
* IF they had won a championship with him;
* IF Piazza hadn't been such an insular and basically one-dimensional player;
* IF Piazza had done something more to win the heart of the greater New York community than hit that post-9/11 home run.
I agree that eight years is not a particularly long time to play with one team, but the Mets have a history of shuttling players in and out of uniform. That's part of the reason why more managers have had their numbers retired than players. (Neither Stengel nor Hodges should've had their number retired, by the way. It's almost insulting to see their numbers hang on the wall and not see #31.)
I'm not a big believer in the "championship" argument, because a championship is never about one player. It's a team accomplishment, not an individual one, and it should have neither a positive nor a negative effect on a player's fitness for a retired number. Mariano Rivera deserves to have his number retired for being the greatest closer in baseball history. Derek Jeter deserves it for being Paul Molitor while successfully duping the New York press and Yankee fans into believing he's some kind of clutch god, someone who's really half-man and half-Ultimate Winner. I wouldn't retire either of their numbers for being on the Yankees when they won a bunch of championships.
It's a little unfair to call Piazza "one-dimensional" when an argument can be made that the one dimension made him one of the five best right-handed hitters in baseball history. (Shocking? Try naming four better, then consider he played the most physically demanding position in the game.) His one dimension made him a baseball immortal, so I can really complain that he didn't ALSO steal 20 bases a year or through out 40 percent of base stealers.
The last point is the one that's most open to interpretation. Some would argue (like me) that Piazza had won the city's heart long before the post-9/11 home run and that simply became the defining moment of his career. Others would say he never lived up to expectations and deserves no special merit. That's a subjective argument, so all I can say is that in my mind, Piazza has done more than enough to get his number retired.
* IF Piazza had been a longer-term Met;
* IF they had won a championship with him;
* IF Piazza hadn't been such an insular and basically one-dimensional player;
* IF Piazza had done something more to win the heart of the greater New York community than hit that post-9/11 home run.
I agree that eight years is not a particularly long time to play with one team, but the Mets have a history of shuttling players in and out of uniform. That's part of the reason why more managers have had their numbers retired than players. (Neither Stengel nor Hodges should've had their number retired, by the way. It's almost insulting to see their numbers hang on the wall and not see #31.)
I'm not a big believer in the "championship" argument, because a championship is never about one player. It's a team accomplishment, not an individual one, and it should have neither a positive nor a negative effect on a player's fitness for a retired number. Mariano Rivera deserves to have his number retired for being the greatest closer in baseball history. Derek Jeter deserves it for being Paul Molitor while successfully duping the New York press and Yankee fans into believing he's some kind of clutch god, someone who's really half-man and half-Ultimate Winner. I wouldn't retire either of their numbers for being on the Yankees when they won a bunch of championships.
It's a little unfair to call Piazza "one-dimensional" when an argument can be made that the one dimension made him one of the five best right-handed hitters in baseball history. (Shocking? Try naming four better, then consider he played the most physically demanding position in the game.) His one dimension made him a baseball immortal, so I can really complain that he didn't ALSO steal 20 bases a year or through out 40 percent of base stealers.
The last point is the one that's most open to interpretation. Some would argue (like me) that Piazza had won the city's heart long before the post-9/11 home run and that simply became the defining moment of his career. Others would say he never lived up to expectations and deserves no special merit. That's a subjective argument, so all I can say is that in my mind, Piazza has done more than enough to get his number retired.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
About Last Night ...
I was busy putting the finishing touches on my Flushing University column last night when the Phillies decided to batter the Mets bullpen and snatch first place right out from under their noses. Of course, the shocking ninth-inning comeback forced me into rewrite stage and didn't give me an opportunity to comment on the debacle.
Luckily for me, loyal reader James Allen perfectly summed up the talking points for last night's game, so I am going to steal from him shamelessly to make my points here.
1) Johan Santana absolutely, positively, unquestionably needs to pitch a complete game last night. However, I put this decision squarely on the manager's shoulders, not Santana's. Jerry Manuel made the biggest mistake of his brief tenure with the Mets last night, and it cost the Mets a game they had no business losing. He has to toss the pitch count garbage out the window in this situation and recognize what was at stake here.
The Mets are paying Johan Santana approximately $150 million over the next seven seasons. He is 29 years old, he had only thrown 105 pitches to that point and he had a three-run lead. It is the height of stupidity to pull him in that situation, ESPECIALLY when your "All-Star" closer has already made it clear he won't be pitching that night. If you don't believe your $22 million ace can get out the 5-6-7 hitters in the Phillies' lineup because he's crossed the mythical 100-pitch bridge, then it's time to pack up shop and go play backgammon, because baseball as we know it is dead.
2) I know that Luis Aguayo has to be thinking that lightning doesn't strike twice, but how can he send Endy Chavez around third in the bottom of the seventh with nobody out and a three-run lead? If Chavez stays put, the Mets have two runners on with nobody out and the 4-5-6 hitters striding to the plate. (And yes, James, Castro should be hitting sixth; someone give Manuel the memo that Castro is already one of the best hitting catchers in the National League.)
Luckily for me, loyal reader James Allen perfectly summed up the talking points for last night's game, so I am going to steal from him shamelessly to make my points here.
1) Johan Santana absolutely, positively, unquestionably needs to pitch a complete game last night. However, I put this decision squarely on the manager's shoulders, not Santana's. Jerry Manuel made the biggest mistake of his brief tenure with the Mets last night, and it cost the Mets a game they had no business losing. He has to toss the pitch count garbage out the window in this situation and recognize what was at stake here.
The Mets are paying Johan Santana approximately $150 million over the next seven seasons. He is 29 years old, he had only thrown 105 pitches to that point and he had a three-run lead. It is the height of stupidity to pull him in that situation, ESPECIALLY when your "All-Star" closer has already made it clear he won't be pitching that night. If you don't believe your $22 million ace can get out the 5-6-7 hitters in the Phillies' lineup because he's crossed the mythical 100-pitch bridge, then it's time to pack up shop and go play backgammon, because baseball as we know it is dead.
2) I know that Luis Aguayo has to be thinking that lightning doesn't strike twice, but how can he send Endy Chavez around third in the bottom of the seventh with nobody out and a three-run lead? If Chavez stays put, the Mets have two runners on with nobody out and the 4-5-6 hitters striding to the plate. (And yes, James, Castro should be hitting sixth; someone give Manuel the memo that Castro is already one of the best hitting catchers in the National League.)
Thursday, July 17, 2008
More on the All Star Game
Trademarq chimed in from Seattle yesterday with these thoughts:
I don't know if anyone has written or commented on the game from this angle, but it seems to me that (Tuesday's) All-Star game was a great representation of baseball in the post-steroid era. Low-scoring, extra innings, stolen bases, sac bunts, sac flies, clutch pitching, defensive gems, minimal home runs (and line drive ones, at that), etc. I hate All-Star games, but that was one of the best fundamental games I've ever witnessed.
Well, poor Dan Uggla aside, I can see where you're coming from. All Star Games typically haven't been the high-scoring affairs that such contests in the other professional leagues usually see, but it would make sense that best and the brightest would engage in a contest that closely represents what the game looks like at that moment.
The stolen bases especially caught my eye - the American League had six swipes on their own. I've always thought stolen bases were as exciting as home runs, if obviously not as productive. They're sort of the baseball fan's guilty pleasure; the food version of "empty calories." Since the American League had only three guys with 20 or more home runs on their roster, it makes sense they would find some alternative ways to score runs. (One more thought that lends credence to your theory - no one in the American League is on pace to hit 40 homers this season.)
Watching the game in extra innings, I have to say there was no point in time where I expected to see a titanic game-winning blast from an American League hitter or a string of extra-base hits from the National League. The pitchers were in control - and as a National League fan I've always thought that's the way it should be. It made for a better game and more entertaining viewing.
Too bad it won't be the Mariners who will be benefiting from the American League's victory this year ...
I don't know if anyone has written or commented on the game from this angle, but it seems to me that (Tuesday's) All-Star game was a great representation of baseball in the post-steroid era. Low-scoring, extra innings, stolen bases, sac bunts, sac flies, clutch pitching, defensive gems, minimal home runs (and line drive ones, at that), etc. I hate All-Star games, but that was one of the best fundamental games I've ever witnessed.
Well, poor Dan Uggla aside, I can see where you're coming from. All Star Games typically haven't been the high-scoring affairs that such contests in the other professional leagues usually see, but it would make sense that best and the brightest would engage in a contest that closely represents what the game looks like at that moment.
The stolen bases especially caught my eye - the American League had six swipes on their own. I've always thought stolen bases were as exciting as home runs, if obviously not as productive. They're sort of the baseball fan's guilty pleasure; the food version of "empty calories." Since the American League had only three guys with 20 or more home runs on their roster, it makes sense they would find some alternative ways to score runs. (One more thought that lends credence to your theory - no one in the American League is on pace to hit 40 homers this season.)
Watching the game in extra innings, I have to say there was no point in time where I expected to see a titanic game-winning blast from an American League hitter or a string of extra-base hits from the National League. The pitchers were in control - and as a National League fan I've always thought that's the way it should be. It made for a better game and more entertaining viewing.
Too bad it won't be the Mariners who will be benefiting from the American League's victory this year ...
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